Turkey and Egypt have entered a new phase in managing the Libyan conflict by establishing direct diplomatic channels with opposing political camps in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean analyst Giorgos Koutsoumis, writing for Capital.gr, Cairo and Ankara are transitioning from open confrontation to an informal mechanism aimed at managing regional competition and preventing military escalation.
The diplomatic shift features high-level engagement across Libya's divided leadership, including a visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Tripoli and Benghazi. During his meetings in Eastern Libya, Fidan conferred with General Khalifa Haftar and Libyan House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh, while Cairo has simultaneously expanded its communications with the Western government of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in Tripoli.
Pragmatic interests drive Turkish and Egyptian outreach
The revised approach reflects pragmatic calculations by both regional powers. Analysis indicates that Ankara has concluded it cannot secure its long-term energy, infrastructure, and political interests in Libya solely through its reliance on the government in Tripoli. Expanding relations with the Haftar family grants Turkey access to Eastern Libya, key energy assets, and reconstruction projects while reducing its exclusive dependency on Dbeibeh.
Egypt has similarly recognized that overturning the Turkish military and political presence in Western Libya carries significant costs. Cairo aims to integrate Ankara into a managed political process rather than pursuing its complete exclusion. Both nations have increasingly emphasized the unification of Libyan state institutions, holding national elections, and preventing a permanent partition of the country, aligning with United Nations frameworks and United States diplomatic initiatives.
Recent high-level contacts underscore the growing frequency of Cairo-Ankara communications. Following diplomatic meetings in El Alamein and a consultation between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Haftar, Fidan held a phone call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Koutsoumis writes that this interaction represents a tacit mutual recognition that neither power can build a lasting settlement in Libya by excluding the other.
Parallel management of the Eastern Mediterranean balance
If Turkey maintains open channels with both Tripoli and Benghazi while Egypt continues expanding its reach into Western Libya, Cairo and Ankara will act for the first time since 2019 as parallel managers of the Libyan balance rather than sponsors of rival warring camps. Such coordination could fundamentally alter the regional distribution of power across the Eastern Mediterranean.
For Greece, this emerging dynamic carries twofold implications. Reduced tension between Turkey and Egypt lowers the risk of renewed armed conflict near Greek maritime borders. However, it also erodes a long-standing geopolitical advantage for Athens, which previously benefited from deep hostility between Cairo and Ankara and Eastern Libya's firm alignment with the anti-Turkish bloc.
Uncertainty surrounds the 2019 maritime memorandum
The primary concern for Greek policymakers is whether Turkish penetration into Eastern Libya will alter Benghazi's position regarding the 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime memorandum. To date, the Libyan Parliament in Benghazi has not ratified the maritime boundaries agreement signed by Tripoli. Speaker Aguila Saleh has repeatedly maintained that the memorandum does not bind the Libyan state without parliamentary approval, while leaving open the possibility of a broader re-examination of Libya's maritime zones.
Fidan's meetings with Haftar and Saleh in Benghazi lend considerable political weight to Turkish strategy in the region. Although there are no signs of immediate parliamentary ratification for the existing 2019 agreement, Ankara could seek a modified or replacement maritime deal that secures broader legitimacy across both Eastern and Western Libya.
A unified Libyan maritime agreement would present a more challenging strategic scenario for Athens than the current unratified memorandum. If a revised deal earns support from Tripoli, Benghazi, the Parliament, and the Haftar family, Greece would lose a key diplomatic argument that the arrangement represents only a single Libyan faction. While Greece's legal arguments under international law would remain intact, its overall diplomatic posture would face greater pressure.
Greek priorities and the 2020 EEZ agreement
The 2020 Exclusive Economic Zone agreement between Greece and Egypt remains a firm legal barrier against total convergence between Cairo and Ankara on maritime boundary definitions. To fully adopt Turkey's position in the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt would need to contest its own signed international agreement with Greece, a step Cairo shows no indication of taking under current conditions.
However, because the Greek-Egyptian maritime agreement is partial, a strategic question remains as to whether Cairo will seek to complete boundary delimitation with Athens or preserve tactical flexibility in its relations with Turkey. This ambiguity elevates the significance of Turkish-Egyptian normalization for Greek national security.
In response to these developments, Koutsoumis outlines three core priorities for Athens:
- Maintain and strengthen its strategic partnership with Cairo regardless of Turkish-Egyptian bilateral normalization.
- Expand Greek diplomatic and economic engagement in both Tripoli and Benghazi.
- Accelerate direct bilateral negotiations with Libya to achieve a Greek-Libyan maritime boundary delimitation.
Ongoing energy exploration activities south of Crete, alongside the involvement of major international energy corporations, lend immediate economic and strategic urgency to resolving these maritime claims.
The emerging Ankara-Benghazi-Cairo triangle
While the normalization of relations between Egypt and Turkey does not pose an immediate threat to the Greek-Egyptian Exclusive Economic Zone treaty, Turkish diplomatic penetration into Eastern Libya shifts a balance of power that had favored Greece for years. Eastern Libya no longer views maritime boundaries as a settled issue and is actively using them as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Turkey, Greece, and Egypt.
Greek strategy must focus on monitoring the newly forming Ankara-Benghazi-Cairo triangle. If Turkey successfully consolidates influence in both Tripoli and Benghazi while maintaining a functional working relationship with Egypt, a qualitatively new regional order will take shape with profound consequences for Greek interests across the Eastern Mediterranean.
