A growing wave of political and public criticism is challenging the authority, legitimacy, and internal operations of national, supranational, and international courts, according to an analysis published on Wednesday by legal scholar Dimitris Skiadas.
Skiadas, a professor holding the Jean Monnet Chair of European Law and Governance at the University of Macedonia and the Constantinos Karamanlis Chair at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, warned that dismantling judicial structures threatens the core concept of justice itself.
In the European Union, the European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs is currently debating a draft report criticizing the Court of Justice of the European Union for a lack of transparency, accountability, and institutional balance.
The proposal, introduced by a Swedish conservative Member of the European Parliament from the European People's Party, directly attacks the Luxembourg-based tribunal's authority to decide whether national courts are sufficiently independent to apply EU law uniformly.
European Union Judicial Disputes
Citing principles of national sovereignty and member state constitutional identity, the European Parliament draft report proposes that the EU Court of Justice establish a process of mutual dialogue with national courts before issuing rulings on their independence.
The draft report also recommends restricting the EU Court of Justice strictly to matters within official EU jurisdiction, leaving the organization of national judicial systems under member state control to foster trust between supreme courts and EU judges.
The proposal follows earlier rulings by supreme courts in Germany, Poland, France, Denmark, and the Czech Republic that raised concerns over the limits of EU judicial action regarding powers transferred by member states to EU institutions.
Internal Operational Controversies
Skiadas noted that the EU Court of Justice has also fueled negative criticism through its own internal administration, including how judicial workloads are distributed among members and potential financial conflicts of interest involving judges in commercial entities monitored by the court.
Operational complaints also involve InfoCuria, the court's jurisprudence search engine. A newer version of the tool sparked widespread backlash over functionality, raising doubts about legal certainty for ordinary citizens.
In Greece, public debate has focused on the European Public Prosecutor's Office, a critical institution within national criminal jurisdiction. Criticisms in Athens center on member appointment procedures and investigative actions, driven by constitutional concerns and domestic party conflicts.
United States Rejection of International Court
Beyond Europe, the United States government issued an official statement opposing the International Criminal Court, calling the tribunal a threat to US national sovereignty.
The US State Department declared that the International Criminal Court holds no jurisdiction over American citizens because the United States is not a party to its founding treaty. Washington signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but withdrew its signature in 2002.
US officials pointed out that domestic American criminal trials rely on citizen juries, whereas International Criminal Court judges are appointed rather than elected. Washington called on member states to withdraw from the treaty and stop cooperating with the tribunal, threatening measures against court personnel.
Judicial Selection and Historical Precedents
To contextualize current disputes, Skiadas cited Roman satirical poet Juvenal, who wrote in the late first or early second century AD in Satire VI, asking who would guard the guards themselves after corrupt officials failed to enforce public morality.
The underlying question dates back 25 centuries to Plato's Republic in 375 BC, where Socratic dialogues examined how to prevent executive, legislative, and judicial authorities from abusing unmonitored power.
While executive and legislative leaders in democratic states are usually elected by citizens, European judicial officers are appointed through executive, legislative, or combined processes. EU Court of Justice judges are chosen by member state representatives after consulting a special committee.
In the United States, federal supreme court judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, while state judges are selected through partisan elections, non-partisan ballots, gubernatorial appointments, or legislative votes.
Reforms and the Protection of Justice
Skiadas observed that growing international skepticism toward judicial bodies stems from genuine concerns over institutional imbalance and democratic legitimacy, as well as political self-interest.
To rebuild public trust, the scholar outlined four essential requirements: full administrative and judicial transparency regarding judges' personal interests, public openness to reinforce democratic legitimacy, clear operational rules, and guarantees of judicial independence.
Skiadas concluded that attempting to dismantle or reject judicial institutions does not harm the courts alone, but undermines justice as the primary check on power and the ultimate refuge for citizens, creating conditions for authoritarian rule and the loss of essential human rights.
