Ukraine, victim of a vicious circle

By Enrique Gomáriz Moraga/Latin America21

At this point in the conflict, two moments must be distinguished: before and after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The first is marked by the responsibility of the different actors when it comes to avoiding a military confrontation. And the current one, which starts from the resounding condemnation of the violation of international law that Moscow’s aggression entails. The responsibility for promoting military aggression against Ukraine rests with the Putin government. But there are many other countries responsible for failing to establish conditions to prevent war.

The EU is responsible for the dissolution of the clear distinction that existed in the 1990s between the interests of the EU itself and NATO regarding security on the continent. Meeting after meeting, this distinction has been blurred, until at the meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on February 19 in Munich, it became clear that the identification of the EU with NATO is almost total.

This determines a second factor: the resurgence of ideological Atlanticism in Europe and the United States. The speeches of Western representatives reflect an excessive confidence in the deterrence that the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance has represented in the previous two decades. This explains the arrogance displayed by its leaders in rejecting any objections from Russia that this expansion affected its security and that the Ukraine case was a point of no return.

In fact, it seems that NATO and the EU have acted on purpose to increase Russian annoyance and thus strengthen the arguments of the Russian autocrat. Mexican analyst Carlos Taibo has written that Putin is largely a product of NATO. He would have to add that the greening of NATO is largely a product of Putin’s arrogance and that this infernal vicious circle is the one that would have to be broken to avoid an escalation of the conflict.

This leads to the Russian intervention on February 24, which opens a new phase of the conflict. Putin’s decision is accompanied by institutional support in the Duma (Russian Parliament) and by the majority of public opinion in his country. That relative internal strength has led Putin to disregard a reiterated maxim: to defend his own causes in a geopolitical confrontation there are red lines that cannot be crossed. By perpetrating armed aggression, Moscow’s argument about the West’s threat to its own security fades under the condemnation of the international community.

With military aggression, Putin has provided the desired political scenario self-announced by the European and Atlantic Alliance hawks. It has managed to make NATO and the United States claim to be true oracles of Putin’s ultimate intentions, that the EU countries significantly reduce their differences (at least in public) and that the UN, whose Secretary General, António Guterres, does not long ago you said you were sure that there would never be an open war, unmitigatedly condemn the Moscow government. In short, with his aggression, Putin loses a good part of his legitimacy inside and outside the borders.

What have been the reasons why Putin has chosen to lead the geopolitical dispute to armed confrontation? There are military reasons that, by the way, have incorporated some erroneous calculations. In fact, the myth has been created, largely thanks to the Western media, that everything that is happening responds exactly to the plans designed by a sinister strategist: Putin. This assumption is far from reality.

As a former head of the KGB, Putin is aware of the importance of having a plan, but also of the need to readapt depending on the context. It is not true that Putin has cunningly used President Macron’s diplomatic option to camouflage his true intention to invade Ukraine. Putin was ready to follow any path to prevent Ukraine’s entry into NATO and force it to maintain close relations with Russia. But the Western response to these demands was a resounding rejection.

On the other hand, the military option is not proving to be as simple as might have been anticipated. The Kremlin’s calculation of rapidly imposing itself on the entire territory of the two provinces, Donetsk and Lugansk, has failed. The Ukrainian government has been capable of a considerable concentration of forces in that region, which has forced Russia to try to avoid it by launching deterrent attacks in other parts of the Ukrainian territory. Something he does on the night of February 24.

It should be stressed that Russia does not have the capacity to consider a generalized territorial invasion, since it is estimated that a million and a half troops would be needed to invade a territory the size of Ukraine. Therefore, with few exceptions, the attacks are concentrated on some border cities and Kiev itself, which is only 60 kilometers from the border with Belarus.

By verifying that there were no obstacles on the way to Kiev, Moscow has made another miscalculation: thinking that the city would fall immediately and that it could turn President Zelensky’s government into a direct military target. But the seizure of Kiev and its government district, which was expected to happen on the night of Saturday, February 26, has not happened because the mobilization of armed forces and militia has achieved the self-defense of the city. It may be that Kiev falls in the next few days, but each day that passes is one more step towards unleashing a guerrilla war in the rest of the country, something that Russia wants to avoid.

A scenario mired in an irregular war that extends over time is what Moscow seeks to avoid; among other reasons because, although Putin today has the majority support of the political actors and the Russian population, that situation can change quickly. Maintaining an open war for a long time and without the slightest political support outside the borders, added to Western economic sanctions, may remind the Russian population of the specter of the failure of the war in Afghanistan.

Putin may also be wrong about the consequences of this military ordeal in the domestic politics of his country. That is why he has just opened the door to a possible negotiation for a ceasefire with the Kiev authorities. And if in principle he has incited the Ukrainian military commanders to seize power, to negotiate with them, that seems to be blurring, among other reasons, because it depends a lot on the speed with which he manages to capture President Zelensky and his government.

The armed conflict in Ukraine, far from ending, may just be beginning. This is something that Ukraine will suffer in any case, which is ultimately the real victim of this war and of the undesirable vicious circle that preceded it. (OR)

Enrique Gomáriz Moraga prepared his doctorate in Political Sociology with Ralph Miliband. He participated in Open Zone and the refounding of Leviathan. He was the first director of Tiempo de Paz, a Spanish magazine on peace and security. He worked at FLACSO Chile and has been an international consultant for agencies such as UNDP, UNFPA, GIZ, IDRC, IDB. www.latinoamerica21.com, a plural medium committed to the dissemination of critical opinion and truthful information about Latin America. Follow us on @latinamerica21