Ukraine, Russia and the recovery of Peru’s multilateral foreign policy

After remaining silent while the Ukraine crisis convened, less than a month ago, top meetings between the United States and Russia, encouraged political meetings between the Eurasian power and the major Western security and cooperation organizations and stimulated Euro-Russian diplomatic efforts At a high level, the government has finally made public its rejection of the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine.

That position, however, has been adopted within the framework of a Declaration of the OAS Member States. It has condemned the “illegal and unjustified” Russian invasion of Ukraine, rejected Russian recognition of the “republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk, challenged the Russian military operation, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the return of talks to resolve the dispute.

That pronouncement, which also points out the international principles violated and suggests a course of action, renews the value of the plurilateral practice in America in search of concrete results perhaps equivalent to those of the 1962 crisis. And it also adds influence to the American States by time that allows lesser powers to find the necessary courage to express themselves with the energy and precision required regarding major systemic crises. And, in this case, to do it in coincidence with Western states that react against aggression by way of economic coercion.

For Peru, the pronouncement has an additional value insofar as it allows it to participate in a collective diagnosis of the crisis, disassociating itself from the influence of dysfunctional government partners (such as Bolivia and Nicaragua). and of regional powers (Argentina and Brazil) that, for different and wrong reasons, refused to sign the Declaration.

This step forward could also lead to a recomposition of the inter-American system while giving rise, in Peru, to a healthy divorce between the national interests of the State in critical external situations and those of a government with precarious support and rocky Bolivarian preferences.

This eventuality, which could imply a restoration of Peruvian multilateral diplomacy, could also be exercised today in the framework of the UN General Assembly meeting that is being held to collectively evaluate the very serious crisis generated by Russia.

This meeting will have as necessary input a draft Security Council Resolution on the crisis that referred to the Russian violation of the principles of non-use of force and respect for the territorial integrity of the State and the demand for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign troops from Ukraine. Although the Resolution was vetoed by Russia (while China, India and the United Arab Emirates abstained), it seems to have illustrated the aforementioned hemispheric Declaration.

In this context, the potential recovery of Peruvian multilateral diplomacy continues, however, divorced from our ability to influence so diminished since 2008.

Even more so when the regional fragmentation produced by the Bolivarian countries (and deepened by the government of Mr. Castillo) is now added to that generated by Argentina and Brazil. These regional powers have reiterated, with their non-adherence to the Hemispheric Declaration, a strange strengthening of cooperation with Russia through the visits made by their presidents to Moscow when the invasion of Ukraine was about to begin. America is plagued by these dysfunctional alignments that Peruvian diplomacy can help clean up to the extent that it adheres to permanent national interests, registers the variables well, and detaches itself from those created by an incompetent and corrupt government.

On the other hand, that eventual recovery of multilateral national interests today has, it is true, only a rhetorical foundation. But this at least allows itself to be measured (indicating evolution) when the hemispheric Declaration is compared with the two national pronouncements issued before and after the Russian invasion.

In the first case, the Foreign Ministry Communiqué of February 18 (fearful rather than prudent to the point of hiding the facts), barely expressed Peruvian concern about the emerging crisis. That generality hovered around the artifice while the foundations of the crisis were described only as a difference in perceptions. In favor of this Communiqué, however, we can mention the clarity on the legal framework in which it should be resolved (the Minsk agreements on separation of forces and armament and Resolution 2202 of the Security Council on the implementation of these agreements). Despite its gaps, that pronouncement was better than continuing to remain silent as it had been happening.

In the second case, the Foreign Ministry at least dared to mention the principles violated during the crisis (those mentioned in the Hemispheric Declaration) but without pointing out those responsible and only following, in the abstract, the pronouncements of the UN Secretary General and generically stating the need for a comprehensive solution to the conflict. This vagueness, which, however, improved the terms of the previous Communiqué, was published on February 24 when the Russian invasion had already begun and its cruelty could be followed on TV.

If the OAS has today provided national diplomacy with the possibility of expressing itself more clearly in this regard, Peru must insist on this channel nationally.

This effort can begin by letting Russia know, already in bilateral terms, the national point of view on the systemic damage that it is causing, the damage that these will cause to Peru and the need for that power to change its behavior to recover its position in the world.

Meanwhile, to limit the damage and get back on track, Peru must adopt pro-Western alignments and collective precautions such as those expressed in the OAS and those that will be defined today in the UN General Assembly.