Ukraine is to be the second Belarus? “Ideally, yes.” Now Putin is implementing the minimum plan

Mikołaj Fidziński, Gazeta.pl: What is Vladimir Putin playing?

Dr Szymon Kardaś, Center for Eastern Studies and University of Warsaw: Putin’s strategic goal has long been clear – it is to delineate the limits of political influence between Russia and other actors in the world space, mainly in Europe. Russia claims to be a quarterback in the post-Soviet space. It is known that Ukraine, from among the post-Soviet states, is a key country here due to its potential and location.

Russia’s goal is to restore its political, economic and cultural influence in Ukraine by means of various types of instruments and thus to seal its dominant position in the post-Soviet space. This is the maximum plan.

Ukraine is to be the second Belarus.

Ideally, yes. Ukraine would be a country with a political regime that is absolutely loyal to Moscow. It would be a country with alliances with Russia in the political, military and economic dimensions, and preferably dependent, for example, on the supply of raw materials. Then Putin’s dream of reigning in the post-Soviet space would come true.

It’s just that after 2014 – after the annexation of Crimea and the first aggression in the Donbas – it was clear that Ukraine was taking a completely different course and there was no question that it could return under Russian wings. It seems utopian to expect that in the foreseeable future any political team in Kiev could be interested, for example, in Ukraine’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union or in integrating in the political and military dimension, for example under the banner of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

That is why Russia has a different plan for Ukraine.

I have the impression that Russia is implementing a scenario that is an absolute minimum plan in the strategic dimension, i.e. destabilizing Ukraine and stopping the course of strengthening Ukraine’s cooperation with the widely understood West – the European Union, NATO, etc.

In my opinion, there is an awareness in Russia that if Ukraine cannot be forced to be part of the political, economic and military space under the aegis of Russia, then at least the path of the country’s integration with the West must be blocked.

What should the West do?

This is the bottom line of Russian activity around Ukraine. Russia is testing the West …

… where is the limit of endurance.

Yes. This is confirmed by the very far-reaching proposals that appeared in 2021, i.e. two draft treaties that the Russians presented to the US and NATO countries. One of the fundamental postulates in them is the commitment of the Western side that the North Atlantic Alliance will not expand further east. Although there are also other serious ideas, e.g. the withdrawal of NATO’s military infrastructure to the level from 1997, i.e. before NATO enlargement, among others for Poland. These are very far-reaching demands from Russia towards the West.

The West’s response should be, first and foremost, unity. When the West begins to be principled and truly speak with one voice, it is always a challenge for Russia.

The second thing should be a very strong sanction response. But these would have to be economic, financial and technological sanctions concerning specific strategic projects from the Russian point of view.

Nord Stream 2?

It would seem obvious that a project like Nord Stream 2 should not be launched. And it is good that the decision to freeze the certification process of this gas pipeline by Germany has been made. This is a very strong message for Moscow that even countries implementing strategic projects with Russia such as Nord Stream 2 are not indifferent to the Kremlin’s aggressive policy. This will certainly delay the launch of the pipeline, although I do not believe that today’s decision by Berlin will mark the end of the project.

Another very painful sanction for Russia would probably be the cut-off from the SWIFT system, which would make international settlements impossible for the Russian financial system.

This option is often referred to as “atomic”. This is a matter for discussion, because this type of sanctions would certainly also have an effect on the western side, so it has to be weighed strongly. But at a time when, in the face of Russian aggression, signals are sent that certain options will not be triggered – and in the context of being cut off from SWIFT, it was said that this is not an option considered – it inevitably encourages the other party very aggressive policy to keep going. So at least it would be more appropriate not to disable certain options at this stage.

The blockade of two Russian banks (WEB and PSB) are already serious restrictions that go beyond the Donbas zone. It is good that Biden also announced his readiness to implement further sanctions.

Where else to hit Russia with sanctions to hurt them?

It would be important to map the assets belonging to Russian oligarchs and attack the capital that has been raised by people associated with the Russian regime or who are part of the local political and business elite.

Are personal sanctions not enough?

Of course, this is also important, because it is a sure signal that the West does not agree to Russia’s policy. An important symbol is the EU announced that it will impose sanctions on Russian parliamentarians voting for the recognition of independence, the so-called Donbas people’s republics. But it is definitely not enough.

In fact, the recognition of the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics by Putin is the sanctioning of the state of affairs that we have been observing since 2014. The territories have, in fact, been under Russian control for almost eight years. If the cost of this movement is only to involve more people or companies operating in these areas on the sanctions lists, then this is definitely too small a penalty for Russia for its very aggressive policy not only towards Ukraine, but also the West, creating a security problem. on its eastern borders.

What about sanctions related to, for example, oil or gas imports?

This is a double-edged weapon. It is hard for me to imagine the introduction of sanctions consisting in limiting the import of energy resources from Russia. Russia’s share in the European market is quite significant – 1/3 for oil and even slightly more for gas.

Agreements concluded between major concerns from European countries, and mainly with Gazprom or Rosneft, are also in force here. So we enter the area of ​​contractual obligations.

It is hard to imagine how they could be blocked.

Someone might say that there are higher values. But on the other hand, there is a prosaic question. How – especially if the sanctions were introduced in the horizon of days or weeks – to replace such significant volumes of imports from Russia. This is practically impossible to do.

I also have the impression that the Russians also take into account in their calculations that they are dependent on the European sales market. For this very reason, in my opinion, the scenario of a major invasion of Ukraine was never too likely. The Russians know that risking a gigantic military conflict with Ukraine would not only generate financial and population costs for them, but could potentially have implications for trade relations with Europe. And the Russians do not want to close these windows.

Strategic sectors such as energy should be looked at carefully and from the point of view of what side is ready for. In my opinion, Russia is not ready to stop the export of raw materials for political reasons. That would be a nuclear weapon and would be detrimental to Russia in the long term. Likewise, Europe is not ready to adopt sanctions that could hit energy imports.

Sorry for the sports comparison, but Putin’s gameplay is more aggressive, but he plays chess, right? But is MMA a full-blown fight? Is the war in Ukraine and the economic war between Russia and the West real?

I am convinced that Russia is not ready to give up its strategic goals towards Ukraine, but it does not want to use the great war instrument to achieve these goals.

A good illustration of this is the recognition of the self-proclaimed republics. This shows that when it was not possible to force the Western side to accept the very far-reaching demands of December 2021, and when it was not possible to persuade the West to force Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements, which in the political part are extremely unfavorable for Kiev, this formal recognition of these two republics is such a form – I cannot find a better wording – “consolation prize”.

I have the impression that at the present stage, a full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a very unrealistic option. Although Vladimir Putin is somewhat obsessed with Ukraine, in my opinion, he would not be ready to take the total risk. It is also about an internal political risk, because if coffins with Russian soldiers started coming to Russia on a larger scale, it would pose a risk of social unrest, and thus could pose a certain challenge to the stability of the political regime. And that is always the main determinant on the Russian side.

Putin sometimes takes a step forward, then pauses and looks for other channels of influence – diplomatic, political and military pressure, pressure, etc. It seems to me that all this is part of the long game against Ukraine, for which Russia is ready.

Why?

It seems to me that Russia is starting from the basic assumption, ie the systemic asymmetry of determination regarding Ukraine. This is a very pessimistic statement and I would like it to be negatively verified, but I have the impression that the Russian determination to rebuild its influence in Ukraine at all costs is greater than the determination of the West to attract Ukraine to itself.

I have the impression that the Russians are building their strategy on this. Will Vladimir Putin be right? It also largely depends on the West.

Why is Putin just now taking this next step?

The Russians diagnosed the good moment, noticed the crisis situations in different parts of the world.

What?

The US administration is weak and focused on China. There is an energy crisis in Europe, to which Russia has contributed a little. There is also a moment of disappointment in Ukraine that the West is not doing as much as it could. The Russians saw there was a good opportunity to push.

And they pressed.

At the present stage, they outbid a bit, because the West failed to meet any of their fundamental demands made last December. But whether they outbid in the long term – we will yet see.

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Germany has suspended the certification of the gas pipeline that is to supply gas from Russia. This does not mean the end of the Nord Stream 2 project yet, but it is a serious warning for Moscow as its conflict with Kiev intensifies. The European energy industry is (still) strongly connected with Russia. What do Russia’s aggressive actions mean for the energy sector in Europe? What is to be reckoned with, what to fear, and how should the West react? We invite you to send questions to the following address: news_gazetapl@agora.pl, we will ask them to an expert this Thursday in the Q&A program.