Santiago Leiras

a new political cycle begins Argentina from next December 10. How to understand this real election earthquake in these hours? Javier Milei’s triumph could be explained by at least five main factors. The first is related to the regional context, the second to the mid-life crisis Argentina’s democracy is going through, the third to the often surprising nature that has characterized Argentine politics since 1983, the fourth to the proposals presented to society by the triumphant candidate throughout the election campaign and the last to the climate of change that government in society.

Regarding the first factor, the region has been a veritable training ground for the emergence of radical right-wing leaders with varying levels of electoral success, from those who came to power such as Donald Trump in the United States, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, high competitive candidates who were defeated in the second round, such as Rodolfo Hernández in Colombia or José Antonio Kast in Chile. At the same time, this regional climate coexists with the context of strong electoral punishment of the various ruling parties in the region in the post-pandemic period, with exceptions to the rule of Paraguay (hegemonic party system) and Nicaragua (one-party system with a non-governmental regime).democratic).

In relation to the second factor, a long cycle of 40 years of democracy It confronts us with a very modest balance in terms of meeting social expectations. It was a process with few achievements and many frustrations related to failure to meet multiple requirements. The hopes raised by that slogan so present in the campaign of Raúl Alfonsín in 1983 were not fulfilled: “with democracy you eat, heal and educate.”

The third factor that explains the rise of Milei is the extensive experience that the country has in terms of the emergence of political actors, undetected by the radar of traditional politics, who quickly managed to become national political references. Such were the cases of Raúl Alfonsín, Carlos Menem, Néstor Kirchner, Mauricio Macri and Alberto Fernández. The exceptions were Fernando De La Rúa and Cristina Fernández.

Also, the pre-candidate Milei presented a number of very controversial proposals to society. Some, like selling organs, are difficult to implement, and others are difficult, although not impossible in Argentina, like closing the central bank or dollarization. All this in the context of a campaign whose main features are the deterioration of public debate and the absence of proposals.

Ultimately, the political climate in the country was marked – and this became visible during the last part of the election campaign – by the clash of two great emotions: on the one hand, fatigue from the long political cycle that began in 2003 – with the exception of Mauricio Macri’s interregnum between 2015 and 2019 – on the other hand, fear associated with uncertain change. Tiredness of the known killed the fear of the unknown.

Finally, what could happen in Javier Milei’s next government? The risk of the “Peruanization” of Argentine politics is likely in the context of the government led by La Libertad Avanza (LLA) which, even with an impressive victory in the second round, will have a very weak parliamentary insertion and no territorial presence due to the lack of having their own administrators or mayors in the municipalities throughout the country. But they will have the main resource in the distribution of public funds: the pen ensures order and discipline.

What paths could Javier Milei take? We can think of at least three. The first time would be a successful attempt to shut down congress like Alberto Fujimori or a failed attempt to shut down congress like Pedro Castillo. What is the main problem with this alternative? It seems that the Armed Forces have no intention of providing any support for decisions of this dimension and weight, as happened in the case of Fujimori and did not happen in the case of Castillo.

Another way would be to try to negotiate with the “political caste”, especially with that part that could share the reform impulse of the new administration. What would be the main risk? Loss of ideological purity of LLA. A political agreement with the “hard” sector of the PRO during the second round would give some indication that the next ruling party will go in that direction. This question will be answered starting December 10 if the PRO finally provides the necessary, albeit insufficient, support to guarantee governance.

Finally, a path consisting of some kind of constant plebiscite gymnastics and even in combination with the previous options. What could be the drawback? A drain on resources and his not-so-enthusiastic supporters. It is a complex scenario, a political scientist will say. (OR)