Let’s start with the basics. Unlike countries like the United States, where impeachment can be initiated for any reason Congress deems justifiable, in Ecuador Article 129 of the Constitution states that impeachment can only be carried out on certain grounds, in this case embezzlement. In other words, impeachment is not an instrument for evaluating the president’s governance, his popularity, or whether or not anyone agrees with his political agenda. Not. The political trial must answer one question and one thing only: are there any indications that Guillermo Lasso committed embezzlement? Nothing more.

It is true that the standard of proof for a political trial is much lower than for a criminal trial, where the guilt of the accused must be proven practically beyond doubt. But the problem here is that no matter how much the National Assembly spins the matter, it is simply impossible that the president committed this crime for a very simple reason: the very definition of “embezzlement” does not fit the behavior that the president is accused of. In a legal sense, the Assembly is actually trying to make a square.

Article 278 of the Comprehensive Criminal Code (COIP) defines embezzlement, essentially, as the misappropriation or diversion of public money by an official entrusted with it. This crime is one of those known as “special crimes”, crimes that by definition can only be committed by certain persons, in this case an official in charge of managing these public funds. No one else can do that. Now, as is obvious, Flopec’s assets were not managed by Guillermo Lasso, but by the director of the aforementioned public company. So, by definition, the president simply could not commit that crime.

Accusing the Assembly makes about as much sense as accusing a person of murdering someone who is still alive.

The Assembly, however, concocted a colorful theory to try to circumvent the stumbling block: accuse the president of embezzlement by “doing nothing.” A crime committed by “doing nothing” is one committed by “doing nothing”. So, for example, a nurse who starves her patient to death is guilty of manslaughter by “inaction”, since the death is the result of “not feeding” the patient. There is a theory here that even though Guillermo Lasso did not embezzle Flopez’s money, he should have investigated the matter further. Thus, by “not doing” what he should have done, the President would be liable for embezzlement, despite the fact that it was committed by a third party.

This folkloric legal theory, however, encounters an insurmountable obstacle: Article 28 of the ZOIP indicates that the criminal act of “inaction” can only be spoken of in cases where “life, health, freedom and personal integrity” are threatened. In no other case. In other words, in the case of the criminal offense of embezzlement, where the public good is threatened, by definition it cannot be committed by “inaction”. Accusing the Assembly makes about as much sense as accusing a person of murdering someone who is still alive.

What game is the Assembly playing? (OR)