Armando Chaguaceda and Felipe Galli * / Latin America21

In a dictatorship, elections – let’s call them better votingThey are used for some things. Although there are no mechanisms for the peaceful and periodic restoration of power, as is the case in a democracy, these elections serve as ornament for formal confirmation – inside and outside the country – of the government authoritarian. Voting also serves as tools co-opt and mobilize sympathizers, harass and demoralize opponents and inform the government itself about the real support of the people.

On Sunday, March 26, general elections were held in Cuba, the nominal purpose of which is to renew the 470 seats in the National Assembly of People’s Power, the highest legislative body (again nominally) of that Caribbean country. Eight million registered voters receive a ballot on which the deputies who will represent their municipality are listed, already determined. You will have several options: vote for the entire list, vote for one on the list or, in the case of municipalities with three or more representatives, vote for some and reject others. There is no option to reject the entire list. So there is no competition. You vote, but you don’t choose.

Ivan, a Cuban baseball player

For many, taking into account the political context of the Leninist regime closed to external scrutiny, such a process would not be interesting. In fact, in the totalitarian Cuba of ten years ago, between 95 and 98% of the registered electorate would vote, an invalid vote would not exceed 3%, and more than 90% would approve the entire list without even bothering to mark any candidate. or someone else. A simple ritual to confirm the legitimacy of a dictatorship. Not voting would be perceived as a sign of disagreement, as an easy way to “mark” the opponent, and for this reason, abstention would always be minimal.

‘El rafter’ Elián González proposed as deputy in Cuba

However, Andreas Schedler (The politics of uncertainty in authoritarian electoral regimesMexico, Fondo de Cultura, 2016) explains that elections during a dictatorship can be for the citizens sands interrogations and mobilization against the government. Adam Przeworski reminds us (Why bother choosing?, A small handbook for understanding the functioning of democracy, Siglo XXI Editores, Buenos Aires, 2019) that these non-competitive elections continue to appeal to the people as the ultimate source of power, which they seek to mobilize to support dictators.

Once these goals are no longer achievable and the numbers drop, the weakening of political control opens the door to challenges from the opposition. In the Cuban case, the gradual decline in participation in these votes – which reached almost half of the electorate in the capital, between abstentions and zero votes in last November’s local elections – is a reflection of demographic trends, with their political correlates.

The battle between Cuba and the “vulture fund” over unpaid debt from the Fidel Castro era

There are examples of increased abstention in the context of authoritarian elections. In Kazakhstan, a former republic of the Soviet Union whose people have not seen a free and fair electoral process in its entire history, the regime led by Kassim-Jomart Tokayev, the successor to post-Soviet dictator Nursultan Nazarbayev, is facing growing abstention in major cities. In the parliamentary elections on March 19, participation fell to just under 53%. Turnout fell across the country, with only 25% of the registered electorate voting in the capital, Almaty.

If we return to Cuba, today we see a divided country. We could distinguish in the current Cuban society, considering its attitude towards the political situation and, above all, towards the electoral process, three thirds. They summarize various social, generational and regional factors that pervade all segments of the Cuban population. Democratically recovering the old North Korean terminology, this panorama – compiled from the sum of several surveys, interviews and two focus groups conducted last October on the island – would be presented as follows

The loyal: This layer includes those who, sympathizing with the government, go out and vote for it. The muscle of social support for the dictatorship is made up of elderly or middle-aged people (who were born and grew up in better times socialism, under the influence of years of continuous propaganda), in many cases with a low level of income, information and political culture; along with members of the bureaucracy, military and related business community, along with their families.

The Hesitant: they oscillate between supporting the government or rejecting it and are the most politically passive and demobilized faction of the population. The electorate that in a democratic regime would alternate between different parties or candidates and that, ultimately, defines the elections. In a context like Cuba’s, these are people who hesitate between voting and abstaining.

Many of them vote with the sole aim of not being labeled as dissidents, while those who abstain do so more out of boredom than a conscious and vigorous rejection of the dictatorship. If they do decide to vote, they are more likely to vote in a way that disrupts the uniformity of the entire list (selective voting for some candidates, blank voting, altering the ballot to invalidate it, etc.). It is the most plural stratum, with an age range from young adults to middle-aged, including the private sector and with appropriate levels of education.

The hostile: We are talking about the opposition to the regime, determined not to go to the elections with the conscious aim of showing their dissatisfaction. They often try to convince other people not to vote. The most vocal opposition age group is concentrated in the youth, intellectual groups and in big cities, although, again, we can find people of all ages here. There are places in the country, with opposition roots, that contribute to this category.

As long as elections are a system or a process and not just a day when voting takes place, there is too much evidence ex ante electoral illegalities in the country. In recent weeks, the dictatorship has used the 3 C’s – control, co-optation and persuasion – to secure favorable votes. Evidence of this is threats to (illegal) observation groups and independent journalists, door-to-door voter mobilization, support marches with officials and sales fairs of scarce food and goods.

The dictatorship will have a hard time reaching levels close to the old 90% typical of the Soviet model. There seems to be a consensus- of from crossing the previous results and recent surveys– that 60-70% attendance nationally is a likely result, with lower levels in capital cities. Something that, under conditions of monopoly of power and propaganda, calls into question the lack of pluralism and representation of the Cuban regime.

However, the shadow of fraud without judgmentin the sum of votes, appears on the horizon. This happened in the GDR in 1989shortly before the fall of the Wall, also in Elections for the Constituent Assembly in Venezuela 2017. Faced with the exposure of their discredit, dictators correct the numbers to show non-existent overwhelming support. Simple logic leads one to conclude why would a regime like Cuba’s, which closes itself off to independent oversight and conducts a process in which surveillance is criminalized, publicly and unreservedly admit the only form of electoral setback it can suffer?

In such a scenario, the complaints of independent observers and the reports of citizens about their (non)voting will be an approximate indicator of the stolen truth. In the end, despite what the regime is trying to sell us, the vote and the score (Hirschman dixit) continue to rise in Cuba, despite the decline in loyalty. (OR)

Felipe Galli (1999, Gualeguaychú, Entre Ríos, Argentina). Student of political science at the University of Buenos Aires, co-founder of Carta Política media, member of the Contexto Cubano initiative.