The serious consequences of the Russian denial of the national status of Ukraine

Internationalist

Immediately after President Putin presented the historic march that would eventually justify an invasion of Ukraine, he proceeded to state recognition of the “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk, to establish diplomatic relations and sign cooperation agreements with them. In this artificial way, according to Putin, a historical injustice began to be resolved (the removal of Ukraine from Russia followed later by the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” that was the fragmentation of the USSR).

Moreover, the Russian president rationalized the righteous mutilation of Ukraine -preceded by the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014- through the denial of the existence of that country as a nation (its territory and population were always Russian, Putin interpreted). This affirmation has the seriousness that brings the person who wields it closer to the annihilation of the opponent.

To get to that point, Putin blamed Lenin and Stalin for the creation of that state while Khrushchev added damage to Russia by cutting off Crimea to hand it over to the artificial republic. And more recently, Ukraine’s anti-Russian proclivity was concretized by the 2014 coup that aligned that state with the West with serious economic and security consequences for Moscow, Putin said.

That ad hoc reasoning indicates that the Russian president is seriously considering the “recovery” of the whole of Ukraine. Consequently, the “recognition” of Donetsk and Luhansk would be only the first step of others not clearly established.

To consolidate this step, Putin consulted with the Duma – which had already “recommended” the recognition in question – to send troops to the new “republics” to “keep peace” in them. The authorization was obtained but the sending of troops has not yet been carried out.

Such an omission has sparked speculation as to whether or not Russia has already invaded Ukraine. The response that the international community must give depends on the response to this approach. The United States considers that the invasion “has begun”. Consequently, it has begun retaliation for the low scale of the planned economic sanctions. These will increase as the Russian invasion increases. The European Union and the United Kingdom are proceeding in a similar way (China, pointing out whom it favors, disagrees with the imposition of sanctions on Russia).

Those initial sanctions (which include Russia’s blockade of primary and secondary markets for debt financing, the US refusal to tolerate foreign investment and trade in and with the “republics”, the suspension of the certification of the Nord Stream gas pipeline by Germany, and specific sanctions on individuals, officials and Russian parliamentarians) would indicate that if the sanctioners have doubts about whether or not an invasion has begun, they are at least clear that the threat of aggression is clear.

Precisely for this reason, they hope that a diplomatic solution will still be possible (a complex issue highlighted by the territorial and maritime siege of Ukraine). Despite the fact that NATO members maintain that this solution depends on Russian behavior, communication between the opponents through alternative channels must be very intense.

In this regard, the Secretary General of the UN, Antonio Guterres, has demanded before the General Assembly that the dispute be resolved within the framework of the provisions of the peaceful settlement of disputes (art. 33 of the UN Charter), has advanced his offer of good offices and has demanded that humanitarian aid be allowed to more than 2 million displaced and needy.

In this regard, Guterres hopes that the parties will focus on the implementation of the second Minsk agreement. The problem in this regard is that this agreement refers, in part, to the separation of forces and weapons in the Donbas region (of which Donetsk and Lukansk are part). Had these been recognized by Russia, Ukraine would have lost control over them and, therefore, the agreement would have been rendered null and void. Such is the Russian argument.

This problem is not only legal, insofar as, at the most recent meeting of the Security Council, the consensus around a possible solution was based on negotiating within the framework of that agreement.

In the event that the Minsk agreement disappears as a priority, the agenda indicates that the “security guarantees” demanded by Russia (aimed at preventing Ukraine from being incorporated into NATO or the European Union as well as a retreat from the military presence of NATO in the former Russian neighbourhood) and by the United States (on arms control, confidence-building measures, non-proliferation, etc.) would return to the fore.

In that scenario, the Russian commitment not to invade the rest of Ukraine and the West perhaps accepting, in return, the territorial relationship between Donbas and Crimea) is a possibility. The reality of power would have been imposed thus minimizing damage to all … but at the expense of Law. At the moment, that is not the scenario in sight. But it may be on the far horizon.

Meanwhile, our authorities should fulfill some essential tasks. First, they must reiterate their adherence to the solutions framed in Public International Law. And second, urge Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua to abandon the explicit support given to Russia in this crisis. Otherwise, the region will suffer long-term consequences.

At the moment these are already heading negatively through the increase in fuel prices that will increase inflation, the possible increase in interest rates above what was expected or the affectation of the stock market, sensitized by uncertainty and stock market interdependence. In sight will also be the impact of the crisis on our military supply, so closely linked to Russia.

In spite of this, the strategic insensitivity of the government and that of some officials may only be expressed in de minimis communiqués.