Boric presidente

There was no need to end up in court, as Gabriel Boric once suggested on the way to the Chilean second round of elections. A 12% advantage over his rival José Antonio Kast (55.7% vs. 44.13%), the rapid vote count, the immediate acceptance of the defeat by whoever won the first round and the assurances of President Piñera that Boric would be the president of all Chileans were factors of unbeatable security on the results of the presidential elections.

Not even the absenteeism of around 45% (less than in the first round) in a country where electoral participation has been optional since 2012, put in doubt the result of a choice between extremely polarized alternatives (the candidates had to mobilize towards the center to ensure decisive support of a space initially lost by both).

However, with 17 senators (out of a total of 50 as of 2022) and 37 deputies (out of 155) from Approve Dignity (vs. 1 and 15, respectively, from Mr. Kast’s Republican Party), Gabriel Boric’s party lacks Sufficient presence in a Congress divided into halves organized by alliances of not very solid consistency. This parliamentary reality reinforced Gabriel Boric’s willingness to consolidate his political conglomerate and build bridges to the opponent after the results were known (although it was Mr. Kast who took the initiative).

That decision was reinforced by the negative reaction of the markets. In the exchange market, the currency devalued between Friday and Monday from 847 to 869 pesos per dollar (expecting an immediate negative fluctuation of between -3.5% and -4.5% according to La Tercera). And in the stock market, the IPSA index of the Santiago Stock Exchange fell, in that period, -7.45% (EP) in a context of global volatility generated by the impact of the variant of COVID 19 (omicron), the change of perspective of the FED towards further consolidation and the generalization of inflationary pressures in the system (PNC Insights).

Such developments were added to the mistrust that Gabriel Boric’s candidacy generated in the business sector as a result of his participation in the student protests of 2011 and the revolt of 2019 and his particular convictions about the welfare state. Added to this is the uncertainty generated by the Constituent Convention (made up of a majority of independents and representatives of the left) whose results will have to be submitted to a plebiscite next year, implying an eventual intensification of the change in the rules of the game.

Out of conviction and necessity, then, the president-elect announced that his purpose was, indeed, to be the president of all Chileans and that, to be so, he would not forget the political history of his Nation-State (a position different from that of the re-founding claims Evo Morales and even Pedro Castillo). Within this framework, it would seek growth with social development, it would respect democracy and its institutions, it would seek broad agreements to seek inclusive progressive development reforms, and it would not decline in the effort to enforce human rights (even in matters of the Chilean past). At this point, Boric preferred not to mention his programmatic approaches to multinationality and treatment of the Mapuche minority.

It is also within this framework that the president-elect will have to carry out, initially, his very complex program of 53 “concrete changes” based on four structural reforms: guaranteed universal access to health, decent pensions without AFPs, a free public education system and quality, and the formation of the first environmentalist (and feminist) government in the history of Chile according to the government plan of Approve Dignity.

It is in Chapter 4 of that program that the guidelines of the new Chilean foreign policy are drawn, which also consists of four priorities. First, multilateralism that will be based on Latin Americanism and the “global south”, flexible integration and cooperation based on reciprocity and solidarity. Second, “entrepreneurship” that implies coordination of external strategies with local development, understanding that although Chile cannot act in isolation from the region, it must preserve “the country’s strategic autonomy spaces”. Third, feminism understanding that “no international issue … can be resolved without a gender perspective” while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be reformed in that perspective. Fourth, the “turquoise” environmentalism derived from the fight against the climate crisis (“the green component”) and the protection of the oceans (“the” blue component “). The “updating and modernization” of the trade agreements culminates the external approach of Approve Dignity.

As can be seen, the deal with neighboring countries does not appear in this approach. The fact that this priority of Chilean foreign policy is defined today by the Chilean Foreign Ministry as the need to strengthen this link in a regional setting from which the “national identity” and the international agenda are projected, does not imply that the national interest or the permeability to dialogue (energy, trade, defense, education, culture and migration) rules out the ideological affinity with neighboring governments. Less now when all of them are governed by the left.

This, however, may not be an always positive determinant if one takes into account issues such as the Bolivian Mediterranean nature that motivated Evo Morales to take Chile to the International Court of Justice (although only to lose the case in a resounding way as many of us anticipate).

With regard to Peru, the Chilean Foreign Ministry reports that, after the maritime dispute was resolved in 2014, a “progressive deepening” of the bilateral relationship began in 2016 (meetings of binational cabinets, consultation and coordination, and integration border) while economic dynamics consolidated Peru as Chile’s third commercial partner in the region and eleventh in the world. And, as is known, Peru is a main destination for Chilean investment abroad.

Those realities should not change unless the strong economic slowdown that looms in South America and the widespread impact of the distrust of economic agents weaken the fundamentals of the regional market.

But this is our opinion. Not necessarily that of Approve Dignity, which, moreover, has not achieved specific consensus on foreign policy in a broader framework. In this regard, there is only the general support of the Permanent Forum on Foreign Policy, which includes prominent former foreign ministers and academics from the Chilean left, to Gabriel Boric’s agenda. There is no news of the other agents.

As there is no news of the reaction of the Peruvian Foreign Ministry, while President Castillo has limited himself to expressing himself curtly on Twitter. In this matter there is much to develop and solve.

axes: human rights, inclusion, promotion of rights and and eradication of violence; justice, a “new democratic state”