Havana livelihood for Castillo

Since the Velasco government resumed relations with Cuba in 1972, intelligence activities and subversive promotion of the Caribbean dictatorship have been part of the daily agenda in bilateral dealings.

Despite the Stop that governed the Cold War in those years, the management of the North-South crisis could not fail to take into account the tireless Cuban interference in the region or be indifferent to the role played by Cuba as a Soviet bulwark in the Caribbean. . In managing that relationship, alertness, with ups and downs, could not help being constant.

Especially if Cuban expansionism had tried, unsuccessfully but with destabilizing effects, to test the theory of “foquismo” in the region. This materialized dramatically in the Bolivian neighbor under the command of one of its most adventurous officers: the murderer Ché Guevara (captured and eliminated in 1967 in Ñancahuazú) while the Cuban policy of “exporting the revolution”, born in the 60s, covered Latin America. from Guatemala to Argentina (under other circumstances Chile would suffer, in 1973, the consequences of attachment to the “solidarity” action of the “companions” of which Fidel Castro’s long view of the neighbor was part).

And no one escapes that the guerrilla movements in Peru (those organized by Hugo Blanco and Béjar -the alleged ex-foreign minister- were just one example) took place, to a large extent, under the leadership of radicalized youth captured by Cuban intelligence to be trained on the Island.

Moreover, Cuban intelligence became part of the urban landscape of San Juan thanks to our successive governments that allowed the headquarters of the Havana embassy to display on its roofs a veritable jungle of communication antennas that adorned the periphery of the aristocratic Golf Club of La zone.

Consequently, it should not surprise us that the new Cuban ambassador to Peru is also an agent of the Intelligence Directorate of that totalitarian state. Except for four fundamental questions.

First, because Ambassador Carlos Rafael Zamora Rodríguez is, according to press information, a high command of the American department of that agency whose capacities for infiltration, information and subversion are as extraordinary as the progressive operational autonomy achieved by Cuba in the sector. , against the Soviet Union in the middle of the Cold War.

Second, because the aforementioned ambassador has a field experience that, while being advantageous for the country that receives him under normal conditions, is dangerous for Peru given the persistent interference tendency of the Cuban government and the proclivities of Peru Libre.

Indeed, the Cuban ambassador has not only “served” in three neighboring countries but has also done so when those countries governed (or govern) regimes affiliated with or sympathetic to Castroism. Apart from his missions in Central America (Panama, El Salvador) or Ecuador in 1984, Mr. Zamora has been in charge of the affairs of his country during the Lula government in 2009 (founder of the Sao Paulo Forum of great regional effect) and today he comes from Bolivia (Peru 21) where he served highly influential during the last government of Evo Morales.

Third, because this occurs just when Morales wishes to formalize, before Christmas in Cusco, the institutionality of Runasur “of the peoples” as a prelude to the re-founding of the already repudiated UNSAUR (Peru, along with other countries, withdrew from that organization ).

Fourth, because there is no doubt that the new Cuban ambassador will be a very efficient Castro-Chavista agent in “backing up” President Castillo and Castro’s Mr. Cerrón. Your contribution to our eventual insertion on the stage of ALBA, the Sao Paulo Forum and the Puebla Group may be decisive.

In other words, the Cuban ambassador will provide revolutionary subsistence services to a government that needs extraordinary support (external and internal) and will be able to guide the government to get Peru to join an unwanted strategic association.

These are very powerful reasons for the “placet” conferred by the government to be denied or redirected towards a more benign option by the Foreign Ministry in its orientation to the president (which is part of its role). But this has not happened.

Consequently, it is essential that the Chancellor comply with the request for information and explanation that, in this regard, has been sent by the Foreign Relations Commission of Congress. Failure to do so would be violating the legal norms on which that Commission supports its request and the Chancellor committing an additional folly.