If Brazilian democracy falters, all of Latin America is in danger

by Hal Brands

The farce of Sunday’s elections in Nicaragua, in which President Daniel Ortega ran with almost no opponents after vetoing or jailing most of them, may serve as the most egregious example of progressive authoritarianism in Latin America. However, Brazil, a much larger and more important country, is also heading for a political crisis. And the history of Latin America shows that if Brazil suffers a democratic collapse, the effects could extend far beyond its borders.

Brazil’s democratic system is relatively young, emerged in 1985 after two decades of military rule, and is relatively fragile. For the sake of social peace, the country largely avoided taking into account the crimes perpetrated by the armed forces when they came to power. Today, civilian control of the armed forces remains more tenuous than in the democracies of North America and Europe.

Furthermore, rampant crime has led to widespread public insecurity, which can easily translate into sympathy for authoritarian government. Recently, disappointing economic performance, corruption and a failed response to the COVID-19 epidemic added to the tensions.

In recent days, the populist president, Jair Bolsonaro, has flirted with the idea of ​​calling for a military intervention in the country’s politics; a majority of Brazilians believe that he is seeking to strike a blow. Additionally, the president has undermined the separation of powers, declaring that he would no longer respect the decisions of the Supreme Court. He has also followed the same tactics of former US President Donald Trump, in misleadingly asserting that the electoral system is untrustworthy, fueling hatred of his political enemies.

For all this, the democracy of Brazil is “in grave dangerOf collapse, writes political scientist Oliver Stuenkel. Bolsonaro’s possible reelection in 2022 could further degrade the country’s institutions and lead him down the path of autocracy, a situation similar to what happened in Venezuela.

If he loses and refuses to accept defeat, violence could follow, on a much larger scale than the January 6 uprising on the US Capitol. Even if he reluctantly surrenders power, future demagogues might emulate his tactics. Failed offers by autocracy sometimes lead to successful ones.

That is not just a problem for Brazil. As scholar Samuel Huntington explained three decades ago, regime type changes in one country often snowball in others.

Would-be democratic reformers draw hope and energy from political breakthroughs in neighboring countries. They can also receive tangible support from a new democracy that it believes will be more secure surrounded by others. Therefore, democratization becomes a virtuous circle, but, according to the same logic, democratic collapses can start a more cruel one.

The past of Brazil proves it. When the nation returned to democracy in the 1980s, it was part of a region-wide awakening. Democratic reformers in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil viewed each other as allies against illiberal forces in their own societies.

The Brazilian government helped protect political transitions in countries like Paraguay, placing democracy at the center of regional institutions such as the Mercosur trade pact. Brazil’s commitment to democracy had international effects.

However, during the previous era of the dictatorship, Brazil it was a bulwark of the regional autocracy. The 1964 coup was part of a series of military takeovers in Latin America, sparked by fears of communism, poor economic performance, and political instability. Brazil’s military regime acted as if its own well-being required supporting friendly governments and overthrowing the menacing ones.

The Brazilian Junta supported the right-wing groups that destabilized the elected socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. Arguably, in the coup that finally toppled Allende, Brazilian politics had a greater impact than that of the United States.

In 1971, Brasilia moved troops to the border with Uruguay in a blatant act of electoral intimidation, when it seemed that the left coalition could win the vote there. That same year, Brazilian operatives also helped organize a coup in Bolivia, and later, Brazil would participate in Operation Condor, an initiative led by Chile to find, imprison, and kill political opponents of South American dictatorships.

The logic of Cold War politics meant that Washington was happy enough to have a right-wing Brazilian regime watching over South America.

“Wish I was ruling the whole continent”Richard Nixon said of Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu Medici. Today, the effects might not be so welcome, as authoritarian governments often turn to China and Russia for support, and democracy experiences a global recession.

Indeed, a Brazilian collapse could be particularly damaging given that democracy is currently struggling in much of Latin America. Venezuela and Nicaragua they are mired in absolute tyranny; while El Salvador is led by the self-proclaimed “coolest dictator in the world”.

Contested elections and violent upheavals have plagued countries from the Caribbean to the Andes. Popular dissatisfaction with democracy increased, throughout the region, from 51% in 2009 to 71% in 2018, according to a survey by Latinobarómetro. The economic, social and political traumas caused by COVID-19 could continue for years to come.

In the meantime, China and Russia They increase their role in Latin America, using tools, from the sale of surveillance technology to diplomatic support for autocratic rulers, that are pushing the region in the wrong direction.

Brazil, as always, it will be a regional benchmark. If his fractured opposition manages to close ranks to defeat Bolsonaro and strengthen a representative government, the democratic forces of Latin America will receive a boost. If, on the contrary, the country’s political setback continues, the beneficiaries will be anti-liberal actors throughout the region. We have to bear in mind that what happens in Brazil does not remain only in Brazil.