Ukraine divides Latin America and the EU, complicating a strategic partnership

Dethlef Nolte *

@Latinoamérica21

Latin America and the European Union (EU) want to deepen their relations again. In July, a summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) will be held in Brussels, Belgium, the first since 2015, and pending agreements are expected to be concluded, as is the case of the EU with the Mercosur. Within this framework, European politicians, such as the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, have recently traveled to Latin America to explore how to deepen bi-regional relations.

There is no doubt that the strategic value of Latin America and the Caribbean has increased for the EU since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Politically, the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean are important when voting on resolutions on Russia in the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN). Economically, Latin America relies on raw materials such as natural gas and oil that Russia supplies to the EU, and strategically important raw materials such as lithium are already imported from the region. Due to its climatic and geographical conditions, Latin America is considered to have great potential to produce and export green hydrogen at competitive prices among the different regions of the world. And Europe will be, in the future, one of the largest markets for green hydrogen.

At the first Latin America-Europe Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, the goal of developing a “strategic partnership” was announced. Since then, the term has appeared again and again in official statements and, more recently, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, went so far as to speak of a “strategic alliance” in relation to the agreement. of association between the EU and Mercosur, pending signing.

There are political and economic overlaps, but the question is: are there enough common interests for a strategic partnership? The preparatory meetings for the EU-Celac summit and, more recently, Chancellor Scholz’s talks in Argentina and Brazil have shown that there is an elephant, or rather a bear, in the room that Latin America would like to ignore, or at least ignore. do not mention.

The war in Ukraine divides the EU and Latin America. What from a Latin American perspective seems a matter of choice (how to position itself in the Ukraine versus Russia conflict), for Europe is a matter of necessity, namely defending itself against a genuine military threat and an attack on fundamental European values. .

It is symptomatic that the joint press release of the III CELAC-EU Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the end of October 2022 in Buenos Aires avoided naming and condemning Russia, as the European governments expected. At the very least, the participating governments were able to reaffirm their support for the objectives and principles enshrined in the UN Charter to uphold the sovereign equality of all States and respect their territorial integrity and political independence. In the context of this statement, the behavior of Latin American countries is even less understandable.

Furthermore, from a European perspective, it is strange that a region, which has always (rightly) denounced the imperialism emanating from the United States, today avoids condemning as imperialism a war to restore an empire and subdue (and if necessary) assimilate by force to other peoples.

The declarations of some Latin American governments are received with incomprehension in Europe, as is the case of the declaration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, president of Brazil, on the conflict in Ukraine when he affirmed that “two do not fight if one does not want to”, that It’s like blaming someone for being hit on the head by someone who broke into their home.

Against the backdrop of the images we see every day in Europe of war atrocities, attacks on civilians and refugees arriving from the Ukraine, these statements seem callous, if not cynical. In turn, they have cost Lula sympathy in Europe, and they question whether he can act as a mediator in the conflict.

Then there are the supporters of an active non-alignment. The point is raised here that it is not possible for a policy of active non-alignment to imply not taking sides indirectly by putting the aggressor on an equal footing with the victim. The point is that, if in a war in which the aggressor is clearly identified, civilians are being killed and war crimes committed, isn’t a government also complicit in doing nothing?

Latin American governments should ask themselves if the world would be better and if it is in Latin America’s interest if the EU comes out weakened, but Russia (and indirectly China) strengthened from the Ukraine conflict. This would mean, in turn, a defeat of the values ​​that Latin American governments have up to now defended in international politics, such as respect for sovereignty, non-intervention and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

An active non-alignment only makes sense if the values ​​that one defends in international politics are also defined, and, based on those values, one decides when to take sides. Sometimes the old Pete Seeger song, What side are you on?is also applied in international politics, especially between alleged strategic partners. (EITHER)

* Detlef Nolte is a Research Associate at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies-GIGA (Hamburg, Germany) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). He was director of the Institute of Latin American Studies, and vice president of GIGA.