Since 1949, the year of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, countries have had four foreign policy options towards China: recognize the People’s Republic; recognize Taiwan (Republic of China, in official name); not recognize any; or recognize both. The “One China Principle” vetoed this last option, leaving only the first three. This principle advocates the existence of a single Chinese state, but there is controversy over which is the legitimate government that represents it.

Beijing has supported this principle since 1949, maintaining a constant and unchanging political orientation towards Taiwan over time. For its part, the Taiwanese authorities supported this principle from 1949 to 1972, the year in which Taipei modified actually its external orientation. Since then, they have unsuccessfully sought what mainland Chinese call “dual recognition,” that is, for a third country to recognize Taiwan at the same time it recognizes the People’s Republic. Something that Beijing absolutely rejects.

Polarized Taiwan chooses between ‘peace or war’, between ‘democracy or autocracy’

The current situation of recognition is largely in the hands of the Asian giant. Of the 194 member states of the United Nations, 181 recognize China. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 26 recognize Beijing and seven recognize Taiwan out of a total of 13 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with the island worldwide. Regardless of the number, the “one China principle” is respected by the international community regardless of who received the recognition.

In South America, Paraguay has recognized the Republic of China since 1957. It cannot be denied that the Paraguayan authorities have respected and maintained the “one China principle” since that year, even though this foreign policy orientation is contrary to Beijing’s interests. The same line of political behavior was pursued by Guatemala, Haiti, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Kitts and Nevis; while Belize and St. Lucia have retained Taiwan’s unsettled recognition.

The fate of Taiwan is our future

Nicaragua is an extreme case of variability. Sandinista severed relations with Taiwan and recognized China in 1985. But, after the Tiananmen crackdown, President Violeta Chamorro decided to re-establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1990; while President Daniel Ortega broke off relations again in 2021 to recognize the People’s Republic. In South America, there is no such inconsistency: Chile, Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and other countries have retained China’s recognition because they have severed ties with Taiwan.

In all cases, respecting the “one China principle” is a decision of countries, which is based on the sovereignty, independence of their foreign policy and the interests that each seeks to protect, especially when China has reached the rank of an economic superpower. It is here that the principle becomes defined as the policy of one China, referring to the action carried out by China and members of the international community in defense and recognition of the said principle.

The pressure that the principle exerts on states is visible when comparing the “Chinese issue” with the “Korean issue”, where both recognize the “two Korea principle”. Indeed, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were politically recognized and established diplomatic relations with members of the international community, as States Parties to the United Nations. The conflict over this issue is still ongoing, while both recognize dual international recognition, allowing third countries to maneuver with greater freedom.

Elections in Taiwan that will mark the fate of the world

Because, The People’s Republic of China’s use of the principle limits Taiwan’s international action by limiting the boundaries of sovereign action of other states., although they retain the final decision on recognition, as expressly suggested by the norms of international law. Recently, Beijing has intensified its one-China policy by applying economic and diplomatic sanctions as a way of disciplining those countries that extend their relations with Taiwan to the political level, such as Lithuania and the Czech Republic. Beijing’s firepower is so important that Ukraine has maintained diplomatic relations with China despite its benevolent neutrality towards Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

The inconsistencies of Nicaragua and other countries show the dependence of foreign policy decisions on the internal changes of states. In democracies, the relationship between political alternation and the “Chinese question” is obvious and has two sides: the first refers to third countries; the second, until modified in Taiwan.

Recently, the political changes in Argentina forced the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to react quickly. Xi Jinping sent a letter to President-elect Javier Mileu in response to the devastating threat posed by the Argentine candidate during the election campaign. This situation also occurred during the 2015 exchange, when Mauricio Macri questioned some aspects of relations with China. At the same time, the political transition from Barack Obama to Donald Trump and the beginning of the “tariff war” between Washington and Beijing. Italy’s exit from the Belt and Road Initiative is another example of change caused by political changes.

The other side is the alternative in Taiwan. This has been a decisive factor in hindering or progressing the dialogue with Beijing. For example, the changes in 2000 and 2016 were a factor of tension after the Democratic Progressive Party (PPD) came to power; while the change of the PPD to the Kuomintang in 2008 meant detente between the parties and the signing of important agreements. Therefore, the election in Taiwan raises questions about the continuity of tensions, if there is a political succession, or a thaw is expected if there is a change. In both cases, this will affect Sino-American relations and the rest of the world, especially in Latin America. But no matter what happens in the elections, the international community will continue to respect the “one China principle”. (OR)

Eduardo Daniel Oviedo is a principal researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) and a full professor at the National University of Rosario (UNR), Argentina.