So many factors are converging and the interests of the parties involved are so difficult to reconcile that the only certainty about Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections on January 13 is that no one really knows which way the conflict in the Taiwan Strait will go when a new president is elected. . But what no one excludes is that the result of the election could light the fuse of a major conflict that involves China and the United States, the two major economic and military powers on the planet, in a war with catastrophic consequences unprecedented for humanity and the fate of the world.

Tension has been cyclical in the area since the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Party took refuge on the island in 1949 and monopolized power after being defeated in a civil war by Communist Mao Zedong. There were two crises with intermittent conflicts in the middle of the Cold War and after acceptance the status quo independent Taiwan actually but no de jure. A third followed in the 1990s, involving Chinese missile launches, as Beijing realized that Taiwan was questioning that status and moving toward independence. Now, in a completely different context, the balance seems more fragile than ever.

The fate of Taiwan is our future

Today, free and prosperous Taiwan values ​​its freedom above all else. Although its society is very politically polarized, especially regarding the paths that the relationship with Beijing must take, the rejection of integration into an increasingly warlike and despotic China is almost unanimous. The authoritarian movement in Hong Kong, where a once-vibrant civil society was destroyed, had a major impact on Taiwanese public opinion. The “one country, two systems” formula, initially intended for Taiwan as an attractive option for citizens because it had to preserve freedoms, was a failure and a deception.

Taiwan’s desire is in direct conflict with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) claim to reclaim the “sacred territory” of Taiwan for the motherland by any means possible, despite the fact that its membership in China is historically debatable. In a recent year-end speech, Xi Jinping once again insisted, “reunification is inevitable.” Taiwan is the missing piece in the ambitious “Chinese dream” envisioned by the Chinese president, which has a horizon of 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic. That Xi is confident in his historic mission and guaranteed in this crusade that he will not face internal opposition after the end of collective leadership within the party does not help to assuage fears of escalating conflict.

We can believe the CCP when its rhetoric calls for a “peaceful reunification” that closes what official propaganda calls the West’s “century of humiliation.” China does not want war now, firstly because it is not sure that it will win it. And, secondly, because its modernization is still the main priority and in that process technological dependence on the United States and the Western world remains evident. Therefore, it took note of the reaction of the West against Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine. But in two circumstances that could change. On the one hand, if Taiwan crosses what Beijing considers a red line, such as declaring independence, it will go to war regardless of the consequences.

On the other hand, although it has other options such as blockading the island, a rising economic and military superpower like today’s China could attack Taiwan the moment it believes it can do so successfully and at an acceptable level of risk and cost. With more or less numantine resistance that Taiwan might offer, the main risk for China would be the entry of the United States into the conflict. Washington’s “strategic ambiguity” in recent decades has been a deterrent, and China could not predict the American response. But now Washington has its own reasons for preventing a Chinese takeover of Taiwan.

It is not only the ideological war of our time between democracies and autocracies, nor deglobalization and the current rivalry between the leading world power and the one that wants to become one. According to various analysts, if China takes control of the so-called first island chain, where Taiwan is located, it could project its power towards the second island chain as far as the US stronghold of Guam and split the Pacific in two. Not only that: it would also jeopardize US maneuvering with its regional allies, who would eventually have to accept Pax Sinica it would upset the balance in the Pacific and, therefore, in the world order. At stake is the end of American hegemony in Asia and the transfer of power to China.

In this context, how will the Taiwanese vote? It is difficult to predict, because Taiwanese society is complex, there is no clear ideological division between left and right, and political polarization is extreme. The descendants of those who arrived on the island in 1949 identify themselves with the KMT, a party of conservative tradition that did not know how to renew itself, which is why it is not very popular among young people. It is committed to dialogue with Beijing, but its excessive closeness to it, including the comprehensive cooperation agreement with China that caused the rejection of most people, the “sunflower movement”, gave power to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2016.

The liberal DPP, currently in power and polling in its favor, has the most belligerent voice against Beijing, but it is important to understand that there are many nuances in both parties, even with openly anti-Chinese profiles in the KMT and people in the DPP who do not support independence. In fact, the Taiwanese electorate is characterized by punishing the leaders and the parties they installed the status quo in danger, either by its approach to Peking or by promoting the island’s independence. According to a local media survey, 46% of Taiwanese believe there will be war in the next five years.

And yet, while Taiwanese routinely experience China’s influence operations and naval and air incursions into their territory, there is nothing resembling a “Ukrainian-style” organized resistance in Taiwan. They officially fight disinformation and cyber attacks, there are limits on China’s presence in the national economy and political and media funding, and the People’s Republic’s critical infrastructure and semiconductor investments are strictly limited.

However, a division is evident among the population, starting with some elites close to Beijing due to the economic benefits offered by the Chinese market. Disunity is perceived as weakness in the context of elections that may mark the future of the geopolitically hottest region on the planet. The consequences can be catastrophic for those involved, the global economy and world peace. According to the political forces on both sides of the strait, the “existential question”, the choice “between peace and war” is resolved in the elections. (OR)

Juan Pablo Cardenal is a journalist specializing in the internationalization of China and editor of the Sinico Analysis project in www.cadal.org