The bombing of the Palacio de la Monedo and the suicide of President Salvador Allende ended the attempt to establish socialism by democratic means and, above all, one of the strongest and most inclusive democracies on the continent. From that moment on, a regime of terror was implemented in Chile that lasted seventeen years and left more than forty thousand victims (killed, disappeared, tortured). At the same time, a country that ranked first in access to education and health has experienced a deterioration in these services due to the implementation of economic policies based on the supposed trickle down that growth is supposed to produce. At the end of the dictatorship, Concertación governments (an alliance of center-right and center-left parties) re-laid the foundations for a robust democracy, drastically reducing poverty levels but not closing the inequality gap. The two right-wing governments that alternated during that period did much less – that was not among their goals. Finally, the radical left came into government, and in response, the extreme right grew stronger. Thus, as we mark the 50th anniversary of the coup d’état, fears of the establishment of polarization are returning.

Hooded men riot to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the military coup in Chile

Allende even considered calling a referendum, his party opposed (…) and left him speechless.

This anniversary and political tension justify the always necessary historical review. In this sense, it is worth asking about the factors that led to this outcome and, above all, about the alternatives that existed at the time. Much has been written about the American intervention under the leadership of Nixon and Kissinger, as evidenced by declassified archives. Those were the difficult years of the Cold War and that was undoubtedly one of the causes, but not enough to explain it. Several internal factors shaped the situation that pointed to a violent outcome, whether it was civil war or the coup d’état that finally took place. The only possibility to avoid this would be an agreement between the ruling party of National Unity (UP) and the Christian Democrats, traditionally located on the center right. However, mutual distrust and, above all, the radicalization of the sector on both sides made this solution impossible. Allende even considered calling a referendum, his party was categorically against it and left him speechless.

Chile will be reborn after hatred and lies

Many of the numerous studies on this case point to polarization as a determining factor in the violent outcome. In a book published this year (Salvador Allende, the Chilean Left and Popular Unity), Daniel Mansuy considers this and turns his analysis around the dilemma of whether it should be understood as a failure or a defeat of the UP. If it was the former, the responsibility would fall on that political organization, and defeat would mean that it was overcome by the greater strength of the opponent and, basically, by aligning the army with them. In any case, the central problem was the gap that opened not only in the political sense, but above all in the social sense. The changes in democracy proposed by the UP required a social consensus that did not exist at any time, as Joan Garcés, one of Allende’s advisers, observed at the same time that the events took place (collected in his book Allende and the Chilean Experience). They are teachings for the present. (OR)