Author: Julio Echeverria *

The President of Ecuador signed on Wednesday morning, May 17, a decree to dissolve the National Assembly, and with it he applied for the first time in the country Article 148 of the Constitution, which was approved in 2008. This instrument, known as the death of the cross, was created to unblock institutional conflicts between functions state, especially between the executive and the legislature. The voters’ idea when drafting the Constitution was to protect the president and prevent his possible arbitrary removal at the hands of an unappealable legislative majority.

The mechanism of death on the cross is the power of the president of the republic in a situation of “serious political crisis”. The characterization of this situation is left to the judgment of the President and does not require the qualification of any other government body. This is a feature of Ecuador’s hyper-presidentialism, which, however, applies the principles of parliamentary democracy by forcing new elections when conflict between the executive and the legislature hinders the functioning of the government.

The application of the cross of death closes the cycle of political conflict between the executive and the legislature and opens another with the restoration of power in both functions of the state. The Constitution states that the State Electoral Council must immediately call for elections for the president and members of the assembly by the end of the remaining term. According to the deadlines that run between the convocation, election and appointment of the new government, a maximum period of six months is foreseen, during which the current president will rule without a legislative body and will be able to approve, by decree, laws of economic urgency, but with the prior qualification of the Constitutional Court.

Then comes the period in which the Government can do its work without interference and restrictions that the National Assembly can set for it. During these months, the ruling party and its coalition have the opportunity to reconfigure their courses of action and strengthen themselves in relation to the elections, where the current president should seek confirmation of his mandate.

The consequences of this situation for other political forces are different. What is an occasion for one, is a serious delight for others. This is the case of the traditional right-wing party, the Social Christian Party, Correísmo’s ally in the prosecution of the president, which saw itself in a situation of strengthening if he were to be removed. The promotion of the vice president to a new magistrate could mean access to a government that is perhaps closer to his political tendencies.

Social Christianity came out of its alliance with correísmo very badly. In the last election, he lost the office of mayor of Guayaquil, his historical political stronghold, but his decline is known throughout the country and he is no longer an option for president. They will surely face a reduction in the number of representatives in the next convocation of the National Assembly.

Other parties of the center left, Pachakutik and Izquierda Democrática, which in the last elections seemed to rearrange their ranks, are also victims of their approach to correísmo. Sectoral divisions attracted by the strength of the correista majority in the Assembly shattered all their projections. The people who were behind their electoral success (presidential candidates Yaku Pérez and Xavier Hervas) are no longer active in their ranks. The Pachakutik leadership is in dispute, and the movement is under siege by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (Conaie), a historic indigenous organization, which wants to take full control.

This is not the case with the Union for Hope (UNES), our party, which led the strategy recall and that he comes out of this situation relatively unscathed. On the one hand, he is suffering from the effect of the dissolution of the Assembly in which he consolidated his absolute dominance, but on the other hand, he is asserting himself as the best force for the next elections. The fragmentation of the opposition could work in its favor in the presidential and legislative elections. His challenge to the cross of death was lukewarm, as he was preparing his forces for possible elections.

Although crucifixion is a constitutional and legal measure, its application is unprecedented in the country’s constitutional history, which creates strong uncertainty. Once again, institutionalism was put to the test and forced to demonstrate its ability to contain.

Three entities will be essential for managing an enormously complex political process: the Electoral Council and the Constitutional Court. The Electoral Council has the task of organizing a transparent and efficient electoral process in a short time, but in a tense political scenario. For its part, the Constitutional Court, which must supervise the actions of the executive power so that it does not exceed the parameters set by the constitution in the absence, in particular, of a legislative body that supervises its actions, will have to evaluate the constitutionality of the extraordinary economic decrees to which the executive power can refer and which become its the main instrument of management and legislation. The operation of setting clear boundaries without the interference of a political actor in the process could consolidate this institution as the most important guarantor of democracy and constitutional rights.

It is to be expected that the Council for Citizen Participation and Social Control (CCCCS), an organization that should be characterized by its non-partisan nature and which recently renewed its composition, could introduce turbulence into political processes. This was clearly aligned with correísmo and stated that it intended to replace the legislature in its task of oversight. It is very likely that Correísmo will try to use this body as a pivot to regain power.

The application of the cross of death in Ecuador will show whether it is useful as an outlet for political tensions between the functions of the state, apart from being intended as a pure protection of hyper-presidentialism. If it succeeds, the countries of the region will have an important lesson to apply to their own designs institutional. (OR)

* Julio Echeverría is a sociologist, has taught at different universities in Ecuador and is the author of several books. Doctorate in sociology at the Università degli Studi di Trento (Italy). Specialist in political and institutional analysis, sociology of culture and urban planning.