It can be assumed that the first goal of the President of the Republic by appointing two retired generals to key positions in the fight against the wave of violence was to respond to the uproar of the citizens. Probably, when making that decision, he considered that the citizens could receive the biography of each of them, in its military aspect, as the beginning of the application of the heavy hand that has taken shape lately. He must have assumed that putting former uniformed officers in those positions might have a calming effect. However, the size and complexity of the problem of organized crime requires a general strategy that is not limited to an armed response and that understands it as a fact of multiple dimensions. For this reason, it is to be expected that the path the Government has decided to take will go beyond the current message, which, without a doubt, will last for several days if it is not realized in concrete terms.

Without questioning the personal values ​​of both former soldiers, there is a latent risk that this decision of the Government will reduce the problem to its most visible part, which is street violence, without taking into account its integrity. Experts on this topic very clearly indicate the complexity of the causes, procedures and consequences of this phenomenon. Among the former, structural factors such as poverty, inequality, exclusion and lack of opportunity stand out, along with the nature of the transnational economic structures of the cartels at the top of the business. As for the procedures, they point out the connection of these mafia organizations with previously existing gangs in the country. The latter are in charge of transporting drugs from borders to ports and receive most of their remuneration in drugs, which encourages micro-trafficking, increases internal consumption, causes territorial disputes between them and generally encourages ordinary crime. The end result is the generalization of violence as we see it every day.

(…) the problem requires a comprehensive, strategic vision, which is not reduced to tactics of repression…

But in addition to all this, the drug trade tries to penetrate the police, military, judicial and political authorities. According to the same experts, it is the most complex terrain in the battle, because it faces an enemy that is within the institutional structure itself and has enough resources to put it at its service. Unfortunately, there is evidence that this is already happening in our country and that it is progressing very quickly. The link between politics and organized crime is facilitated by institutional weakness, the blindness of the political class and an aversion to establishing agreements on problems of this nature. The reference of many of them to the Bukela model, as shown in the last elections, shows an absolute lack of understanding of the problem (it would be convenient to ask if the drug cartels calmly accepted the loss of such an important base as El Salvador or if there was an agreement to replace the power of the gang with another modality).

In short, the problem requires a comprehensive, strategic vision, which is not reduced to tactics of street repression. The two new officials are obliged to build it and implement it, without reducing it to militarization. (OR)