The National People’s Congress, whose main task is to ratify at the headquarters of the legislative body the guidelines previously adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has begun its annual session, where the next few days will see an increase in the number of loyalists to Xi Jinping in the main positions of the new government. , such as administrative reform to centralize power in the hands of the KPK. But at the opening of the session, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang hinted at some of the most pressing priorities for China in 2023.

The communist executive announced a 7.2% increase in military spending, a figure known to represent only a fraction of total military spending, but relevant in the context of a possible war with Taiwan, which many see as inevitable. All in all, as usual at the beginning of the parliamentary session, the economic situation and forecasts were at the center of a good part of the prime minister’s speech, as befits a regime whose source of legitimacy in the eyes of the people is well-being.

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The economy will grow “more or less” by 5%, according to Beijing. Progress that is still below the pre-Covid period and light years from the flat growth that allowed China to grow at an average of 9% for more than three decades. In Chinese terms, it is as intuitive as a healthy rhythm, supported by consumption after the enormous self-inflicted damage with the Covid-zero policy. Just in building PCR test kiosks spread across the country, China has wasted the equivalent of Estonia’s gross domestic product, an ideological and useless decision advised by the WHO.

But Li Keqiang’s speech also revealed two strategic goals of the communist country. On the one hand, the need to be self-sufficient in technological matters, to be able to avoid the pressure and sanctions of the United States in this area. After the ravages of the pandemic and amid a growing rivalry with Washington, US controls on exports of semiconductors and related technology to China, with precedent-setting sanctions on Huawei, prompted Beijing to react.

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Up to 143,000 million dollars could be set aside for the development of its own semiconductors, a sector of the future led by – precisely – Taiwan. The economic and geopolitical connotations are huge, so fiscal incentives are expected for the chip sector, as the rest of the industry will revolve around this key technology. Deepening relations with Germany, as a supplier of technology, could be a priority for Beijing to advance its industrial development. Tectonic movements sharpening amid Beijing’s hostility to the West.

On the other hand, another strategic goal is to guarantee China’s food security, a factor that has been explicitly mentioned. This makes Latin America crucial to the Asian country’s interests, although it carries the implicit risk of being subordinated to China’s industrial interests by being a mere supplier of natural resources. And that is that, as is known, the low added value of raw materials does not serve long-term employment or the accumulation of industrial wealth. To this should be added the ecological and social cost, a recurring and dramatic side effect. History shows that bilateral relations of dependency thus become chronic.

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China’s interest in guaranteeing its food security is evident in Argentina, as food represented 84% of its total exports in 2022. Since 2014, according to official Chinese statistics, Argentina’s grain exports to China have increased by 0.52% to 17%. And sales of Argentine meat and offal increased from 3% to 34%. At the same time, some Argentine manufactures with higher added value, such as leather or wine, have significantly reduced their weight in exports to the Chinese market.

On the other hand, the relationship with Brazil, the first Latin American trade partner of the Asian giant, is almost identical. Its exports have grown by 135% since 2014, but soybeans and mining resources make up 75% of the total export basket. The exponential growth in the sale of meat and offal, +1.915%, is also noteworthy. Therefore, China sees Latin America as a strategic region that guarantees food security, with which it exchanges raw materials for production. A model that critics call neocolonial.

Furthermore, in Latin America, taking into account that Beijing has investments in about forty regional ports from which it can export to China, the future infrastructure strategy will be more selective from a geopolitical point of view. This has already been revealed in the Belt and Road Initiative, with less investment and more selective. So the party for à la carte infrastructure and soft financing is over.

A report presented by the Chinese premier said that, on strategic issues such as food security or the future supply of raw materials, the priority is not to cement “mutually beneficial” relations, establish “win-win” cooperation or build a “community of shared destiny” with Latin America .These are just polite words of political idealism on which to build political strategies aimed, for the most part, at the ultimate maximization of China’s strategic interests.Pure political realism for the coming cold war. (OR)